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                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                    FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                         CR No. 22-00433-MCS-1
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              Plaintiff,
                                         GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE AND
14
                                         OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
                                         TO COMPEL
                   v.
15
    HERBERT REDHOLTZ,
                                        MOTION HEARING DATE:
16
         aka "badherb51@hotmail.com,"
                                        October 16, 2023, at 3:00 p.m.
17
              Defendant.
18
19
         Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel
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    of record, the United States Attorney for the Central District of
21
    California and Assistant United States Attorney Nisha Chandran,
22
    hereby files its Opposition to Defendant Herbert Redholtz's
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    ("defendant") Motion to Compel (Dkt. 29) ("Motion").
24
         This Opposition is based upon the attached memorandum of points
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    //
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| 1   | and authorities, the files and records in this case, and such furthe  |
|-----|---|
| 2   | evidence and argument as the Court may permit.                        |
| 3   | Dated: September 19, 2023 Respectfully submitted,                     |
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#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Herbert Redholtz ("defendant") is charged with distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography through his email account, badherb51@hotmail.com. Defendant now moves to compel the production of information relating to the government's sensitive, internal charging decisions that he speculates contains favorable information. Defendant's motion is premised on baseless speculation, including about witnesses and evidence that are not relevant to the charged case, about the reasons for the government's actions and decisions in connection with the instant prosecution. The government is not privy to the defendant's claims in his in camera filing, and thus cannot respond to those claims in this filing. But his motion makes clear that defendant is on a fishing expedition that this Court should reject.

The government is well-aware of its discovery obligations and has evaluated defendant's allegations. The government has produced more than 1,000 pages of discovery in this case, including a recent supplemental production in response to defendant's additional discovery requests. In response to this motion, the government also re-reviewed its files for any discoverable material responsive to defendant's speculative motion to compel and confirmed that it is in compliance with its discovery obligations, including under <a href="mailto:Brady v.Maryland">Brady v.Maryland</a>, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), <a href="mailto:Giglio v. United States">Giglio v. United States</a>, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and its progeny. The government will continue to fulfill those obligations on an ongoing basis. Because defendant's demands seek internal Department of Justice charging information not required by law -- indeed, sensitive information that is protected from

disclosure for good reason -- defendant's motion to compel should be denied. Any other result would have a detrimental effect on prosecutorial work product, discretion, and deliberation.

#### II. BACKGROUND

#### A. Factual Background

# 1. <u>Defendant Sent and Received Child Pornography from a Hotmail Email Account</u>

On October 17, 2014, defendant attempted to send an email to another individual from his Hotmail account, badherb51@hotmail.com, that contained a suspected child pornography image. In the email, which had the subject line "Re: very talented," defendant wrote, "suck daddys cock, you little whore," in response to previously receiving an image depicting a nude prepubescent minor female who appeared to be performing an oral sex act on an adult male.

Microsoft reported the email to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children ("NCMEC"), explaining that the user of badherb51@hotmail.com had received a child pornography image and then attempted to resend the received image.¹ NCMEC generated a Cyber Tip report with the flagged email, associated the badherb51@hotmail.com email address with defendant through defendant's public MySpace account, and shared the tip with law enforcement. Homeland Security Investigations ("HSI") Special Agent Kimmesia Sampson began

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> NCMEC functions as a clearinghouse for illegal child sexual abuse images reported by U.S. electronic service providers and thus has unique insight into identifying images of child sexual abuse being distributed on the Internet. By using hash values, or unique numerical identifiers assigned to digital files like a "digital fingerprint" for the image, NCMEC uses technology to help enable service providers to compare hash values associated with child pornography images on their services with hash values that NCMEC maintains of known images of child pornography.

investigating the NCMEC Cyber Tip and confirmed that the email account was associated with an IP address registered to defendant at his home in West Covina, California.

## 2. Search of Defendant's Email Account Revealed Hundreds of Images of Child Pornography

On March 17, 2015, the Honorable Alicia G. Rosenberg issued a federal search warrant for defendant's badherb51@hotmail.com email address. Case No. 15-MJ-0469. Microsoft provided records in response to that search warrant on March 22, 2015.

Agent Sampson began review of the email content from Microsoft, but did not complete that review. Agent Sampson left the Los Angeles HSI office and the case was reassigned to HSI Special Agent Derek Baker in November 2019. Upon taking over the case, Agent Baker reviewed the case file and status of the case and applied for a new search warrant for the email records produced by Microsoft for the badherb51@hotmail.com email address. Case No. 20-MJ-02510.

In the affidavit supporting the warrant application, Agent Baker explained that, based on his review, it appeared that only approximately 2,200 items from the Microsoft data had been previously reviewed and categorized by Agent Sampson, but that more than 250,000 items remained uncategorized. Agent Baker further explained that, based on the analysis of a HSI Computer Forensic Agent, the digital evidence from 2015 appeared to be in the same condition at the time of Agent Baker's application for a new warrant. On June 3, 2020, the Honorable Maria A. Audero issued a new federal search warrant authorizing SA Baker to review the email records produced by Microsoft for defendant's badherb51@hotmail.com email address. Case No. 20-MJ-02510.

As authorized by the warrant, Agent Baker reviewed the full content of the email records produced by Microsoft for defendant's badherb51@hotmail.com email address. From that review, Agent Baker independently identified 448 unique images as child pornography, 109 unique videos as child pornography, 402 unique images as child erotica, and 25 unique videos as child erotica. In November 2022, these 850 images and 134 videos were submitted to NCMEC so that NCMEC could identify whether any of the children in the images and videos were from a known series. NCMEC responded that approximately 282 of the files appeared to depict at least one actual child that had previously been identified by law enforcement. The charges in this case are based on the content of defendant's email account.

## 3. Search of Defendant's Home Led to Seizure and Forfeiture of Digital Devices

In June 2015, HSI agents, along with Los Angeles Police

Department officers, searched defendant's home pursuant to a federal search warrant. Case No. 15-MJ-1060. In a brief interview, defendant admitted that he used the badherb51@hotmail.com email address. Relevant here, HSI agents seized and imaged a cell phone and a laptop that belonged to defendant (collectively, the "digital devices").

In August 2015, defendant was notified that his digital devices were subject to civil forfeiture consistent with U.S. Customs and Border Protection's ("CBP") administrative forfeiture policy.

Defendant submitted a petition seeking relief from seizure of the

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  A "known series" refers to a child pornography series with which law enforcement is familiar and has seen in the course of casework.

property and requested that CBP consider his petition administratively. In his petition, defendant acknowledged that he was giving up his right to have the case immediately referred to the U.S. Attorney for court action. In September 2015, CBP informed defendant that his request for relief was denied. Defendant filed no supplemental petitions and the forfeiture was complete in January 2016. Because those digital devices were forfeited, the government was lawfully permitted to retain them.

When the case was re-assigned to Agent Baker after Agent Sampson's departure, Agent Baker similarly attested to the Court that, based on the analysis of an HSI CFA, the digital device evidence extractions from 2015 appeared to be in the same condition and obtained a new federal search warrant to review the digital device evidence. Case No. 20-MJ-02510. However, with respect to those digital devices, Agent Baker explained that there appeared to be no documented progress made by Agent Sampson regarding her review. After obtaining a new warrant, Agent Baker independently reviewed the digital devices, but found no child pornography or child erotica images or videos. The government does not intend to use any evidence from these digital devices at trial.

#### B. Procedural Background

#### 1. Defendant Was Charged by State Authorities

Based on Agent Baker's review of defendant's badherb51@hotmail.com email address, on or about November 2020, the case was presented, but declined for federal prosecution by the United States Attorney's Office for reasons unrelated to the investigation of the case. The state charged and arrested defendant in March 2021 for possession of child pornography, in violation of

California Penal Code § 311. LASC Case No. KA126846. The case was called for preliminary hearing on September 1, 2022 and trailed to September 22, 2022.

## 2. <u>Defendant's Case Was Adopted Federally and Government Produced Significant Discovery</u>

The federal Indictment in this case was filed on September 21, 2022. Dkt. 1. Defendant first appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which the charges in this case were pending on September 28, 2022, and was released on bond pending trial. Dkts. 6,8.

Defendant was charged with five counts for distribution and receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A),(b)(1), and possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B),(b)(2). The federal charges are based exclusively on child pornography found in defendant's badherb51@hotmail.com email address, and from Agent Baker's review of those emails in 2020. Each of the files charged in the indictment were also verified as known child pornography images by NCMEC.

The government has produced more than 1,000 pages of discovery, including the NCMEC Cyber Tip and other NCMEC reports, preservation requests and search warrants, audio and video recordings of interviews, law enforcement reports, surveillance and search warrant photographs, chain of custody documentation, forensic examination reports, and correspondence between defendant and CBP regarding forfeiture of defendant's digital devices. The government made its initial discovery production on October 6, 2022 and has continued to supplement its discovery, as appropriate, including in response to defendant's supplemental discovery requests. The government has also

made available for review the contents of defendant's badherb51@hotmail.com email and digital devices.

#### 3. Defendant Filed Motion to Compel Charging Information

In March 2023, defendant sent the government a list of eleven supplemental discovery requests.<sup>3</sup> In response to those requests, the government undertook a thorough review, produced additional discoverable materials, and confirmed that it was aware of its discovery obligations under <a href="Brady v. Maryland">Brady v. Maryland</a>, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), <a href="Giglio v. United States">Giglio v. United States</a>, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and its progeny, and that it had complied with them.

Defendant filed his Motion to Compel the Production of Brady
Materials (Dkt. 29) ("Motion" or "Mot."), demanding that the
government turn over sensitive work product and other materials
relating to the deliberative process, namely, six broad categories of
information relating to the government's charging decision and
impeachment evidence relating to Agent Sampson. (Mot. at 1.)
Specifically, defendant seeks discovery related to: (1) the federal
government's initial decision not to prosecute defendant in November
2020; (2) communications between federal and state prosecutors about
the status of defendant's state prosecution; (3) the District
Attorney's office's inability to proceed with the state prosecution;
(4) the federal government's adoption of the state case in September
2022; (5) the impact of the federal indictment on defendant's state
case; and (6) the personnel file and any other Henthorn material
regarding Agent Sampson. (Mot. at 1.) In support of the Motion,

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 3}$  The supplemental discovery requests encompassed the subject matter of the first five requests in the Motion, as well as other topics.

defendant filed a declaration under seal and <u>in camera</u> that has not been shared with or viewed by the government. The Court set a hearing on the motion for October 16, 2023. (Dkt. 32.)

#### III. ARGUMENT

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The government has complied with its discovery obligations. While the government has not seen and thus cannot respond to allegations made in the in camera submission, the factual background of this case shows that the stated bases for defendant's Motion are (1) inaccurate and speculative, or (2) irrelevant to the substance of the case. Defendant's Motion includes six separate categories of discovery demands, all of which demand information traditionally shielded from disclosure based on the work product and deliberative process privileges. But the charging function is within the special province and broad discretion of government prosecutors and removing that protection would chill the exercise of prosecutorial discretion that is the exclusive province of the Executive branch. Moreover, for each of these demands, defendant has failed to articulate any plausible factual basis to support how the information sought would be favorable or why the information is in the government's possession. The Ninth Circuit has explained that motions like defendant's which put forth mere speculation to justify discovery requests should be denied. Compelling disclosure of this protected, sensitive information would have devastating effects on the ability of prosecutors to freely and faithfully evaluate and discuss cases.

#### A. Legal Standard

"There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case." Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 335 (2014) (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)). There are

two sources of the government's discovery obligations in a criminal case that are relevant to the instant motion.

First, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure establishes guidelines for pretrial production by the government, as well as reciprocal discovery by the defendant, of certain limited material, including items "material to preparing the defense." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i). Under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), a defendant is entitled to documents that she can show are material to the preparation of her defense. Rule 16, however, expressly excludes the "discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by an attorney for the government or other government agent in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2). See also Rule 16 Advisory Comm. Notes - 2013 Amendment ("a defendant's pretrial access to . . . documents under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) remains subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 16(a)(2)"); United States v. Fort, 472 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2007).

Second, under <u>Brady v. Maryland</u>, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) and <u>Giglio v. United States</u>, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), the government must turn over to the defense evidence in its possession that is favorable to the defense and material either to guilty or punishment. <u>United States v. Bundy</u>, 968 F.3d 1019, 1031 (9th Cir. 2020). In the pretrial context, the government must disclose favorable information in its possession, without attempting to predict whether disclosure would be material to the outcome of trial. <u>Id.</u> at 1033. Material can be favorable "either because it is exculpatory or impeaching." <u>Id.</u> at 1031. But <u>Brady</u>, <u>Giglio</u>, and its progeny do not require the government to disclose neutral, irrelevant, speculative, or

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inculpatory evidence. <u>See, e.g.</u>, <u>United States v. Stinson</u>, 647 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011).

And in a motion to compel Brady material, a defendant must provide more than speculation that favorable information exists. defendant's allegation that the requested information might be exculpatory does not entitle her to an unlimited or unsupervised search of the government's files. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 (1987). "It is the government, not the defendant or the trial court, that decides prospectively what information, if any . . . must be disclosed under Brady." United States v. Lucas, 841 F.3d 796, 807 (9th Cir. 2016). Short of "defense counsel becom[ing] aware that ... exculpatory evidence was withheld and bring[ing] it to the court's attention, the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final." Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 59. To "challenge the government's representation that it lacks Brady information, [a defendant] must either make a showing of materiality under Rule 16 or otherwise demonstrate that the government improperly withheld favorable evidence." Lucas, 841 F.3d at 808; see also id. ("Unless defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's attention, the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final."). "[M]ere speculation about materials in the government's files [does] not require the district court to make those materials available, or mandate an in camera inspection." United States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1200 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). See also United States v. Lischewski, 2019 WL 2211328, \*1-2 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2019) (explaining that even without looking to materiality, the defendant must show "more than mere speculation that Brady material may exist").

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### B. Defendant's Requests Regarding Charging Decisions (Requests #1-5) are Speculative, Irrelevant, and Inaccurate

Defendant's first five requests pertain to federal and state prosecutors' charging decisions. As an initial matter, many of these internal deliberations are protected by the attorney work product and deliberative process privileges and are not discoverable. As many courts have recognized, protecting internal work product and deliberations from disclosure "encourages forthright and candid discussions of ideas and, therefore, improves the decisionmaking process." United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, Rule 16(a)(2) explicitly notes that Rule 16 does not authorize discovery of internal government documents made in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case. But even setting aside the fact that defendant's request seeks privileged information about its charging decisions, the government has rereviewed the files in its possession in response to defendant's requests and confirmed that it has and will continue to comply with its discovery obligations under Brady, Giglio, and its progeny. Defendant's proffered bases for these requests are inaccurate, speculative, and irrelevant.

First, defendant attempts to paint the investigation as "mishandled," but this is inaccurate. Defendant says "two things are certain": that Agent Sampson did not timely complete her review of defendant's email data and that the government improperly retained defendant's devices for five years. (Mot. at 7.) But defendant bases the conclusion that Agent Sampson did not timely complete her review of defendant's badherb51@hotmail.com email data on two handwritten notes that lack context. Even if defendant is correct

that those notes pertain to June 19 and June 29, 2015 dates on which Agent Sampson reviewed emails, that review was timely. The warrant issued for the badherb51@hotmail.com email directed that the search should be completed no later than 60 days from the date that the response was received from Microsoft. Case No. 15-MJ-0469.

Microsoft returned records for the badherb51@hotmail.com email on May 22, 2015. In short, defendant's claim that it is "certain" Agent Sampson exceeded the warrant deadline is inaccurate.

But more importantly, Agent Sampson no longer works at HSI Los Angeles, the exact status of her review is unclear, and this case turns on Agent Baker's 2020 review of the badherb51@hotmail.com email data -- not Agent Sampson's review. Thus, any potential error by Agent Sampson was remedied by the new 2020 federal warrant that authorized review of the badherb51@hotmail.com email data by Agent Baker after disclosing the unknown status of Agent Sampson's earlier review.

Additionally, defendant's digital devices were forfeited in 2016, so defendant's suggestion that any devices were improperly retained is misplaced.<sup>4</sup>

Second, relying on these inaccuracies, defendant's basis for seeking to compel discovery is entirely speculative. Defendant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Defendant argues that federal prosecutors would have been concerned about investigative delays (Mot. at 7), but those speculations are also inaccurate. The investigation in this case was not completed until 2020 - when Agent Baker completed the review of defendant's Microsoft data. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) (holding that purely investigative delay is not unconstitutional); United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that ongoing investigation, the transfer of agents working on the case, and other investigative needs were legitimate reasons for delay). Defendant was indicted in 2022 soon after the review was complete.

theorizes that federal prosecutors "would undoubtedly" be concerned about the case, arguing that defendant's theory "seems entirely plausible." (Mot. at 7-8.) Defendant's own argument concedes that he is making "mere speculation about materials in the government's files," Mincoff, 574 F.3d at 1199-2000, and he has not affirmatively identified any exculpatory or impeachment evidence in the government's possession.

At best, defendant says that "to the extent" the federal government's declination was related to Agent Sampson, or "if" federal prosecutors' communications pertained to Agent Sampson or other investigation handling concerns, that information must be produced. (Mot. at 8.) Despite defendant's pure speculation that this material exists, the government has exceeded its discovery obligation, re-reviewed its files, and confirmed that no such documented concerns or communications exist. And, again, the charges in this case are exclusively based on defendant's badherb51@hotmail.com email data, Agent Baker's 2020 review of that data pursuant to a federal warrant issued after Agent Sampson's incomplete review was disclosed, and NCMEC's analysis of the child pornography resulting from Agent Baker's review.

Third, cases from this circuit underline that defendant's speculative basis for his discovery requests is insufficient and that the Motion should be denied.

For example, in <u>United States v. Mincoff</u>, 574 F.3d at 1199, the defendant was informed about a contradictory statement made by a witness during FBI interviews. The defendant filed a motion for <u>Brady/Giglio</u> material, requesting untruthful or incomplete information or testimony and notes taken during FBI interviews. Id.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of that request, explaining that, aside from the single contradiction, defendant had not sufficiently identified any potentially exculpatory evidence not disclosed to him. Id. at 1200. It explained that defendant's "mere speculation about materials in the government's files," did not require the court to make those materials available or conduct an in camera review. Id. In United States v. W.R. Grace, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1083 (D. Mon. Nov. 23, 2005), the defendants sought documents showing that W.R. Grace communicated potential dangers of a product to prospective The defendants argued that, because the discovery included one letter from W.R. Grace to a prospective buyer advising of risks, that "one would expect to find," other examples of these advisements. Id. The court denied defendants' request, explaining that "[d]efendants' speculation as to the existence of other documents showing notice to prospective buyers is insufficient to warrant an order directing the prosecution to hunt for other examples 'one would expect to find." Id. Rather, "[t]o merit discovery under Rule 16, the defense must present 'facts which would tend to show that the Government is in possession of information helpful to the defense." The Court further explained that:

Neither a general description of the information sought nor conclusory allegations of materiality suffice. The government is subject to self-executing obligations under <a href="https://executing.org/lines/by-executing-executi

Id. (cleaned up).

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In both  $\underline{\text{Mincoff}}$  and  $\underline{\text{W.R. Grace}}$ , the moving party was made aware of the existence of  $\underline{\text{Brady}}/\underline{\text{Giglio}}$  material, pointed to that

Brady/Giglio material in support of seeking additional similar materials, but their requests were still denied because they amounted to mere speculation about materials in the government's files. Here, defendant's motion cites no actual evidence that the materials sought exist and is based entirely on speculation. The government has complied with its discovery obligations and defendant has no reliable basis to assert that the government is withholding favorable evidence. See also Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n. 15 (explaining that defendant must establish a basis or "some plausible showing" for claim that information would be material).

#### C. Defendant's Request Regarding Agent Sampson (Request #6) is Irrelevant and Inaccurate

As discussed above, defendant's request regarding Agent
Sampson's personnel file is based on unsupported assumptions and is
irrelevant because the charges are based on Agent Baker's 2020
review. But more importantly, Request #6 seeks impeachment
information. The government is only required to examine personnel
files of law enforcement officers it intends to call as witnesses at
trial. See United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29, 31 (9th Cir.
1991). This case is based on Agent Baker's investigation, and the
government does not currently intend to call Agent Sampson at trial.
Accordingly, because defendant's Request #6 appears directed solely
to information to be used for impeachment purposes, it should be
denied on that basis.

Should this case proceed to trial, the government will disclose its witnesses pursuant to the Court's trial order and will fully comply with its obligations under the Jencks Act, Giglio, and

### Henthorn.

### IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the government respectfully requests that this Court deny defendant's Motion.